

Review Article

ON NARRATIVE

1982

and

Seminar Notes

THE CONSISTENCY OF TIME

1984

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Introduction

On four different occasions this year I shall be lecturing on time. I shall be arguing that it can help make sense of our lives if we think of time as a verb rather than as a noun.

I turned up these seminar notes while sorting out my old files early in January. They represent an earlier version of my argument, and acknowledge some of the sources on which I am drawing, many of which I had forgotten.

Shrove Tuesday, 2001

Review Article in Harvest, 1982

ON NARRATIVE - Edited by W.J.T.Mitchell. University of Chicago Press, 1981

I first realised the importance of narrative in my work when I was concluding my training at the Jung Institute in 1965. We had to write summaries of the various cases we had seen under supervision. I had about fifteen to do. I was surprised to realise that only four of these had been anything like my own analysis. The others were different, in some cases quite different. There was much more variety in what I was doing with my patients than I had been led to expect in my training.

In 1972 I started supervising people called counsellors at the Westminster Pastoral Foundation. I compared the work they were doing with their clients with what I did in my own practice. Sometimes the work seemed to be of a different kind, sometimes of the same kind. The similarities got me thinking afresh about what went on between me and my patients. It seemed that I was engaged in work which was both richer and looser than I had been taught to expect. I had a sense of exuberance, but also of anxiety, that I was losing touch with the rules of my own training. I found myself reading more widely in the literature of hermeneutics, and through that came to a more sustained critical interest in story in general.

In analysis and in counselling we tell bits of our life stories. We pay to have our stories listened to, sympathised with, criticised, interpreted. The work we do ourselves both during and after is geared into the difference between telling and living our story. By the middle of the 1970's I was thinking a lot about story, and reading books of a kind which had never been mentioned in my training. Frank Kermode's *A Sense of an Ending* was a decisive turning point. Now I know that my work, whether I think of it as counselling or analysis, commits me to the study of the rules that govern story.

This book which I have asked to review for Harvest is a collection of essays which grew out of a symposium on "Narrative: the Illusion of Sequence", held at the University of Chicago in 1979. There are fourteen contributors. They explore how we tell, understand, and use stories. To quote from the blurb: "through their exploration they demonstrate that the study of narrative has taken a quantum leap in the modern era. No longer the province of literary

specialist, it has become an invaluable source of insight for all the branches of human and natural science. These essays dramatise and clarify the most fundamental debates about the nature and value of narrative as a means by which human beings attempt to represent and make sense of the world".

Probably for readers of *Harvest* the two most immediately interesting essays are by Roy Schafer and Ursula Le Guin. Schafer writes on *Narrative in the Psychoanalytic Dialogue*, and draws on argument which he has developed at greater length in his books. He concludes that the primary narrative problem of the analyst is not how to tell a normative chronological life history. It is how to tell how the analyst *retells* something told by the analysand, and the analysand's response to that retelling. He concludes:

In the narration of this moment of dialogue lies the structure of the analytic past, present, and future. It is from this beginning that the accounts of early infantile development are constructed. These traditional developmental accounts, over which analysts have laboured so hard, may now be seen in a new light: less as positivistic sets of factual findings about mental development and more as hermeneutically filled-in narrative structures. The narrative structures that have been adopted control the telling of the events of the analysis, including the many tellings and retellings of the analysand's life history. The time is always present. The event is always an ongoing dialogue.

Ursula Le Guin's contribution is a delight. I could no more summarise it than I could *The Wizard of Earthsea*. She calls it "It was a Dark and Stormy Night; or, Why are We Huddling about the Campfire?" If you want a taste of how the study of narrative could help us move more surely between the stories of myth and of transference, and as long as you are prepared to jettison most of your textbooks, start with this retelling of a Plains Indian story, told in English by an anthropologist of German antecedents, forty years ago, to a ten year old, by the campfire, on a dark and starry night in California.

"On Narrative" 1982 and "The Consistency of Time" 1984

But for a more substantial taste of what the study of narrative has to offer us, I want to look at three of the other essays: Frank Kermode's *Secrets and Narrative Sequence*; Victor Turner's *Social Dramas and Stories about Them*; and Paul Ricoeur's *Narrative Time*.

1. Frank Kermode's theme is that there is always conflict between narrative sequence and secrets, and that this is what story depend on for its interest. Story line begets, and is begotten of, our sense of secret. I think this has powerful implications for the training of both analysts and counsellors.

A good story has to be able to submit to the desires of this or that mind, without giving up its potential for secret. "Tell me a story" - that is what it's about. If a story is to be worth telling again, it must rest in its secrecy. If it is worth going on with (which is very important when it is *my* story which is at stake), it must retain its secrecy. Yet if it is to hold its audience, it must reveal its secrets. It must tell what it has to tell. How does it combine both?

In this essay, Kermode's answer is by way of an analysis of Conrad's novel *Under Western Eyes*. He has developed it elsewhere in relation to the parables of St Mark's Gospel in his book *The Genesis of Secrecy*. What he does it to look for the dialogue between story and interpretation.

I cannot develop his argument here. But I want to register its significance for analysis. He writes:

This dialogue begins when the author puts pen to paper and it continues through every reading that is not merely submissive. In this sense we can see without too much difficulty that all narrative, in the writing and the reading, has something in common with the continuous modification of text that takes place in a psychoanalytic process (which may tempt us to relate secrets to the condensations and displacements of dreams) or in the distortions induced in historical narrative by metahistorical consideration.

The conjunction of history and psychoanalysis is telling. I want to suggest that if we put this dialogue between story and interpretation at the centre of our field of attention when we practise analysis and counselling, familiar problems would rearrange themselves and allow for ease of movement between our work and the world in which we make a living.

Questions about how much analysis do I need?, how long do I need to go on?, is this analysis or counselling?, can be put more generally. Ideas of resistance and defence tie us and free us into story. Every story is in danger of being overread, and of being underread. If we overread, we may read more into it than is there. If we underread, we may miss the point. Getting it right depends on striking a balance between attending to sequence and allowing for secret, between allowing it to run on and listening for secret. We may be too heavily invested in secret. Our symptoms may be evidence of such over investment. But so may the eagerness of the professional interpreter. There are times for just seeing what comes next.

I think this is what I began doing in Zurich, when I wondered at the unexpected differences between my various training cases. And I went on doing it when I began asking myself whether analysis and counselling weren't really the same thing. I was realising, in Kermodé's words, that "secrets are at odds with sequence". A passion for sequence may result in the suppression of secret. A passion for secret can lose the story line. What's it like, that "being at odds with" between secret and sequence? Our idea of secret changes radically once we realise that stories are not told within a context that is not-story, but that all our being in the world is an enfolding and unfolding of story by story.

2. Victor Turner is an anthropologist whose work may be known to readers of Harvest through the writing of Dr Henderson of San Francisco, who spoke at the 1974 Jung Congress on the importance of his idea of "liminality" in helping us to recognise and analyse the important middle ground of social ritual between personal and archetypal experience. His theme in this book is relevant to all of us who feel that the study of groups can teach us as much about human nature as the study of individuals. I am particularly interested in his analysis of social dramas as mediating not only between personal and collective, but also as establishing how the present "fits" between past and future. He is analysing what Jungians

call feeling. But he is doing so in a way which opens the analysis not only into law and politics, but into history too.

Take the metaphor he uses when talking about the rules of ritual performance. He describes them as a "source of channelings". Is he mixing his metaphors badly? How can the making of channels, the activity of channeling, have a source? What kind of source can we imagine as the origin not of channels, but of channel making?

The phrase occurs at the end of a paragraph in which Turner explains why he thinks of ritual not as a set of rules, but as essentially an enactment. The rules frame the ritual, but the ritual transcends its frame. A river needs banks or it will be a dangerous flood. But banks without a river epitomise aridity. To perform is to carry out a play, an order, a project. But in the carrying out originality is possible. Performance can transform itself. New bottles can be made for new wine. But though the making is new, the matching of wine to bottle, of ritual to frame, is old.

I think Turner is describing the same mixture of originality and laid-downness as Jung circumscribes with the (to my mind badly chosen) word archetype. He is describing it socially, in performance, in ways which open easily into the work of the ethologists. But for my practice, as analyst and counsellor, what interests me is his description of how we do justice both to the source and channel, originality and laid-downness, when we tell our stories.

We do so *subjunctively*. He introduces the term in discussing, with reference to Boehme and Eckhart, what he calls the abyss in ritual.

Many definitions of ritual contain the notion of 'depth' but few of 'infinite' depth. In other words, such definitions are concerned with finite structural depth, but not with infinite 'antistructural' depth. A homelier analogy, drawn from linguistics, would be to say that the passage from ritual as elicited by van Genneep, postulates a unidirectional move from the 'indicative' mood of cultural process through culture's 'subjunctive' mood back to the 'indicative' mood, though this recovered mood has now been tempered, even transformed, by immersion in subjunctivity.

"Infinite antistructural depth". Are we reminded of other ways of talking about the abyss of ritual? Turner himself recognises that he is close to Jung, two paragraphs later. He places the indicative-subjunctive distinction alongside the actuality-potential distinction as he describes the liminal phases of life.

One thinks of Eliade's studies of the shaman's journey where the initiand is broken into pieces and then put together again as a being bridging visible and invisible worlds. Only in this way, through destruction and reconstruction, that is, transformation, may an authentic reordering come about. Actuality takes the sacrificial plunge into possibility and emerges as a different kind of actuality. We are not here in the presence of two like but opposed forces as in Manichaeism: rather there is a qualitative incongruence between the contraries engaged, though Jung's daring metaphor of the incestuous marriage of the conscious ego with the unconscious seen as an archetypal mother poses that relationship in terms of paradoxical kinship and affinity. Subjunctivity is fittingly the mother of possibilities of being, some of which may be actualised in space-time somewhere or somewhen else. The hard saying 'except ye become as a little child' assumes new meaning. Unless the fixing and ordering processes of the adult, the *sociostructural* domain, are liminally abandoned and the initiand submits to being broken down to a generalised *prima materia*, a lump of human clay, he cannot be transformed or reshaped to encounter new experience.

As I read Turner on how social symbols establish the different kinds of connexity between various dimensions of narrative structure, I am envious of colleagues who work with groups and families as well as with individuals. I envy them their opportunities to experiment with dramas which plot narrative against scene, scene against narrative. I hope some of us can join together more regularly to use what we call the dramatic model to explore this sociality of feeling, in which values and meanings are tested against each other in performances which the individual can never understand alone. Because Victor Turner persuades me that there is work to be done here of a kind which I was never taught in my own training.

3. Of the three essays which I have selected for attention, Paul Ricoeur's on *Narrative Time* excites me most. For those who are drawn to Jung's idea of synchronicity yet left in varying degrees of dissatisfaction with what he has to say about acausal connecting principles in our lives, Ricoeur's analysis of the ways in which narrative and time are related is well worth reading, difficult though it is.

Readers of *Harvest* are familiar with Dr von Franz's work on time. Ricoeur's approach differs from hers in the emphasis he gives to story as constitutive of time. Story does not just unfold in time. It enters into the making of time. If followers of Jung are to hear what Ricoeur is saying we have to pause on this emphasis. The time of biology, the time of physics, is subordinated to the time of history, of autobiography. There is, he argues, a structural reciprocity between narrative and temporality. This reciprocity underwrites the distinction between causal and acausal connections to which Jung has drawn our attention.

I believe that if we were to study this structural reciprocity between narrative and temporality we could make some progress with those questions about the costliness and effectiveness of time which otherwise go a-begging between analyst and counsellor. Without going into the detail of Ricoeur's dense argument, which includes a critical appreciation of Heidegger's analysis of within-time-ness, I want to try and suggest where such progress could begin.

Remember first the 'strong' sense which Ricoeur, and the other contributors to this symposium, give to the word narrative. Stories are told in the world. But the world is itself story shaped. The world we know, in which we find ourselves, on which we are called to act, is itself a-telling. The word narrative is being used to focus attention on this unfolding and enfolding of the storyness of being in the world.

Ricoeur sees every narrative as combining two dimensions, the episodic and the configurational. The episodic dimension is chronological, and characterises the story as made out of events. The configurational dimension is nonchronological: it is better thought of in spatial terms. It is how plot construes significant wholes out of scattered events.

These two dimensions of narrative, the episodic and the configurational, depend on each other dialectically. A story is *made out of* events to the extent that plot *makes* events. (Compare Turner on the mix of 'making' and 'matching' in ritual performance.) Plot acts to elicit pattern from succession. This act is essentially reflective. To tell and to follow a story is to reflect upon events in order to encompass them in successive wholes.

Every sentence there needs an essay to amplify it. But let me try to relate what is being said to my practice.

I do this through ends and beginnings. I find that over the years the question: is this the time to end?, teaches me constantly to review how to begin with my clients, to review the sense of expectation, of intention, of what it is all for, to which I am willing to commit myself and others. In what Ricoeur says about the dialectic between the episodic and configurational dimensions of narrative I recognise the balance and the tension to which I try and hold in the timing of analysis (as I called it in my paper for the 1971 Jung Congress). What matters is not how much of our story we tell, but how the telling and the living work on each other. To play on the word: what matters is how "telling" the telling proves to be in performance between our beginnings and endings.

Read again the conclusion which I have quoted from Roy Schafer's essay on *Narrative in the Psychoanalytic Dialogue*. Ricoeur shows how we can analyse the 'hermeneutically filled-in narrative structures' in a way that allows story to determine its own timing. He shows how 'then' plus 'and then' plus 'and so on' gives us our linear time. He shows how the reflective act implicit in configuration allows the whole plot to be translated into one 'thought', so that the correlation between thought and plot supersedes the 'then' and 'and then' of simple succession. He shows how configuration allows our sense of an ending to play on the episodic, so that repetition and recollection can resonate some particular happening. And then, with that radically originative turn which he has given to the whole psychoanalytic tradition in his book on Freud, he shows how such recollection establishes human action not only within time but within memory.

This is one of my resting places as I ponder the difference and the sameness between analysis and counselling. Memory is not just 'of' the past. It is always 'of' the future too, for memory repeats the course of events according to an order that is the counterpart of time as stretching between a beginning and an end. How much we need to remember about the past, and the quality of our future intentions, are dialectically related. If we are to get our timing right, in psychoanalysis or in counselling, that is the dialectic we need to study.

I have taken these three essays to try and suggest how the new work being done on narrative could be of interest to students of Jung. There is much else in this volume: essays on history, pictures, film, and one by Jacques Derrida on *The Law of Genre* which I cannot understand but which seems to be saying something of the greatest importance about how style enters into the conflict between sequence and secret, into the movement between indicative and subjunctive, and into the dialectic between episodic and configurational. Abundance indeed.

There is much in the Jungian tradition which is friendly to story. With the opportunity of new, alternative, trainings before us, let us attend to these wider studies of narrative. There is tell of a more convivial grounding to our discipline, up for the finding.

SEMINAR NOTES - JUNG CLUB, LONDON - 1984

First Seminar - April 30

1. 'Spread' of the six seminars - the gaps.

Want to use them, to help real dialogue between us.

So use this one as introduction, and to bring together those of you who are familiar with my ideas about time, and those who aren't.

2. Aim:

to link more easily the 'big' distinction between time and eternity with the 'small', everyday, petty, ways we experience time in our living.

time and eternity: do people believe in eternity any more?

the feeling content of eternity for me:

a) the relationship between time after death

time before birth

"where was I before I was born?" and my fear of dying, vibrate together

b) the way something out of history can make me weep on occasion: what my children call my 'historical holies'. History can be safely past for most of the time. Then it is suddenly present in a way that can be very embarrassing, if you don't like seeing your father in tears.

3. My approach:

a) start from Jung's description of the dramatic structure of dreams, Vol. 8, paras 561 to 565 in the CW: paper of 1945 "On the Nature of Dreams"

b) my *Hypokrites and Analyst* paper, where I applied dramatic structure to complexes and the process of interpretation, to try and link what goes on inside analysis with life outside analysis

c) how this interest in drama got me into beginning and endings: Frank Kermode's book *Sense of an Ending*

d) elaborate this by comparing drama with story:

story in Jungian tradition, von Franz, Hillman, and drama with its entrances and exits

e) "consistency":

the play on the two meanings

where it comes from: work on mood - my 1982 paper

mood and music

music and emotion, feeling, mood, and mathematics

we are trying to understand something which ought to be as

easy and as difficult as music

"On Narrative" 1982 and "The Consistency of Time" 1984

4. Introducing the Ricoeur essay on *Narrative Time*, the central text of these seminars

- the book it comes from: my review in Harvest, 1982
- warn about its difficulty: Heidegger
- encourage: I have prepared a section by section commentary, with key words
 - preoccupation
 - readiness
 - recollection
 - happening, event
 - episode, configuration
 - repetition, retrieval

- in terms of contemporary Jungian debate, we will be talking into the archetypal-developmental argument

- synchronicity as a sort of vibrational matrix which generates causation, providing it with a context which is both satisfying and frustrating

5. But as we study the text I want also to develop an exchange with dream material brought by you. Here I want to refer to the other reading I've suggested, to make these points:

- everyday speech about time is full of the words and expressions and assumptions about the consistency of time which we need
- but it has to be rediscovered, by rediscovering a sort of primitive naiveté
- between anthropological, cross-cultural, studies of time and our dreams.

6. Summary of Ricoeur's paper *Narrative Time*

- a) the contrast between living my story, and telling my story; how are they related?
- b) living my story: in the stream
 - telling my story: some sort of ability to reflect, to 'arrest' the stream for a time, so as to take a look at it
 - how are the 'in-the-stream-ness' and the 'ability to reflect' related?
- c) behind this (almost technical) question, is something else which gives it a different kind of urgency, the problem of ends and beginnings
 - ends - death
 - beginnings - sex, what puts us into time in the first place
- d) how do ends and beginnings affect the question of 'in-the-stream-ness' and 'ability to reflect'?, or - in other words: what sense does this week make?
 - does my story refer to anything outside itself?
 - how does history relate to biology, to evolution?

Second Seminar: May 14

1. Picking up from last time

- links between story, time and death
- Ricoeur's use of, and criticism of, Heidegger
- Heidegger and the 'non transferability of death'
- R argues that the emphasis on story alters that fundamentally: death as something which can be shared, transferred, in the telling of story

2. Pages 166 and 167 of R's *Narrative Time*

- read out marked passages
- the three levels, as compared to linear levelling off
 - that 'in' which events take place
 - historicality
 - deep temporality
- a) deep temporality: first and last things
 - relate my history/evolution question to
 - sexuality and death
- b) historicality: recovering extensions through repetition
 - "let's go over what happened"
 - which is what we do in therapy, and also what that social state
 - of mind which we call history does
 - importance of the link between these two
- c) that 'in' which events take place:
 - this, the closest to us, is the most difficult to grasp, and yet is
 - the key to the whole argument. I want to look at it
 - through the word event (a key word for these seminars)

3. Event. We usually think of events as taking place in time, as if time existed independently of events. I suggest that this is wrong. It is the other way round. Time is made of events, and what does the making is the quality of the event.

When we think of events as taking place in time, what is the consistency of the stuff 'in' which events take place? It is in-consistent. Some of it is emptier than the rest. It is bit-ty, dis-continuous. We speak of an un-eventful day. Some of it is emptier than the rest, so empty that we can talk of a non-event.

Ephemeral. [Give us our daily bread. Give us our ephemeral bread.]

I suggest that we need to think of time as carried by events. If nothing happened at all, would there be any time?

Take that further: let the quality of the event come to the front of our minds as more interesting and mysterious than time. Then there's a kind of 'turn of the mind', and we find that we are trying to understand time in terms of event, and not the other way round. We derive our understanding of time from the quality and texture of events, of all kinds of events.

4. Understanding of time derived from the quality or texture of events ('preoccupation')

This is what R is talking about later in the essay when he stresses the distinction between 'now' and 'now that', in order to counteract the 'levelling off' of linear time

I want to illustrate by playing 'event' against 'happening'

Two words: German	Geschehen
English	Occasion

5. Geschehen

es geschehe	so be it
es geschieht ihm recht	it serves him right
es geschieht ihm ein Unrecht	he is wronged
er wusste nicht, wie ihm geschah	he was puzzled, dumbfounded
es ist um mich geschehen	I am done for
Dein Wille geschehe	Thy will be done

Geschick	fate, destiny
geschicht	skillful, clever, handy

6. Occasion

a) A falling together or juncture of circumstances favourable or suitable to an end or purpose, or admitting of something being done or effected; an opportunity

In early use especially in pregnant sense of opportunity: an opportunity of attacking, of fault finding, or of giving or taking offence; a 'handle' against a person

[cp Onians on *καιρος*, in *Origins of European Thought*]

[Note also 'to take time, or occasion, by the forelock' associations, where occasion has been described as 'personified as a female bald behind', with ref. to Latin: suggested by the representation described in Phaedrus Fab.v.viii "Calvus, comosa fronte, nudo occipio...Occasionem rerum significate brevem". See OED for further examples.]

b) A juncture or condition of things, an occurrence, fact or consideration, affording ground for an action, or a state of mind or feeling; a reason, ground; also, in pregnant sense, good or adequate reason: = Cause

c) An occurrence leading to some result; hence, generally, that which produces an effect = cause. (example: a person who causes or brings about something, especially one who does so incidentally.) [*As You Like It*: IV .1.168 "that woman that cannot make her fault her husband's occasion"]

d) That which gives rise to discussion or consideration; the subject being treated or debated. Obsolete - but suggestive for amplifying 'event'.

e) A juncture of circumstances requiring or calling for action; necessity or need arising from circumstances

f) That which one had need to do; necessary business; a matter, piece of business, engagement. Usually in plural: occasions = affairs, business. Obsolete.

g) A juncture of circumstances, in itself, the falling out or happening of anything; a causal occurrence, event, incident; the course of events: ["as it fell out..."]
"the rough torrents of occasion" 2 Henry IV 4.1.72

h) A particular casual occurrence or juncture, a case of something happening; the time, or one of the times, at which something happens; a particular time marked by some occurrence or by its special character.

i) An event or function of some special kind; ceremony, celebration.

The five meanings in Shakespeare given by C T Onions in his Glossary help bring the various meanings to life.

All these are illustrations of pages 169-170 (Ricoeur quoting Heidegger):

"The making present which interprets itself - in other words, that which has been interpreted and is addressed in the 'now' - is what we call 'time'"

Compare also: "To rise to an occasion".

Third seminar: May 21

PART I

1. Attempt further reply to question last week: "What does Ricoeur mean by temporality?"

"I take temporality to be that structure of existence that reaches language in narrativity and narrativity to be the language structure that has temporality as its ultimate referent"

Three examples:

- ephemeral: my five year old son and the butterfly: "what's the point?"
- patient with 14 year old before ear operation: the bridge 'thrown' between them - "I'll be waiting for you", the gap between father and son, initiation
- Cenotaph: historicity, weight of the past, repetition

What do they have in common?

2. Repetition, not only of a moment in passing time, but also as a constancy, something which can be counted on.

Consistency, in the sense of being there to be counted on. The linear act of counting, which presupposes a ground which is constant, which can be counted "on", "on" which counting can be done.

Can time be counted on?

- rolling out like a strip of carpet in front of one, the road along which we are travelling
- but then there are ends (death), and also beginnings (just as much of a problem)
- go back to our example: "will I be ready when the baby is born?"
- readiness, and being able to count on, to reckon with
- in our example, what has to be counted on is the 'catching', and the about face which makes catching possible
- so 'counting on time' implies anticipation which can turn on itself, which doesn't go on without turning back, which remembers to remember

3. 'Lest we forget': implications of

- We are familiar with idea that if we forget appointments then we can't be counted on. I want to add: is there a sense in which time itself cannot be counted upon if we forget to remember?

- If we accept this, then remembrance is not just a looking back which takes place within the flow of time, but an act which keeps us ready
makes us ready
readys us (where 'to ready' is a verb)

so that readiness is a sort of two way relationship between our human being-prepared (lest we forget), and the can-be-counted-uponness of time making its (demanding)-presence felt.

4. Being in time is then

- a welling up which is also a fixing, a setting
- a resource which is also an imposition of limit
- both the freedom and the fatedness of history

Music as example again

- "You must count, dear"
- you have to count to keep time
- if you forget to count, the time can't be counted on. Both the player and the music are out of time, you miss your beat, you aren't ready to come in, you either have to give up or to start again

PART II - Bringing the public and private together

1. Relate to what I was saying last week about events, deriving our experience of time from event rather than the other way round. How do we imagine the events of our lives as being arranged? [Key words: thread and field (or matrix); episode and configuration; fluid conductor]

- a) - a sequence of events, threaded in order of years and months and days, between now and the date of my birth
- some places on the line of that thread seem to be more eventful than others. Events are closer together, more densely packed
 - at some places, much thicker and denser: as if these were the times that really mattered. I might talk of them as 'turning points' in my life. (Turning? Think about that.)
- b) - how do these eventful times differ from the rest?
- for instance, the first few months or years on the thread, the beginning
 - this can seem an empty place, compared say to the event-fullness of my 32nd year.
 - but when I am half persuaded on the truth of the psychoanalytic vision of life (as I sometimes am), it seems as if this beginning is more event-full than any other place on the thread: as if events then were much fuller, heavier, with more push, stamp, in them, packing more punch, with more lasting power, than later events
 - it is as if there is more eventing at the beginning than in the middle
 - or to use a more familiar metaphor, as if the beginning is like a seed with all subsequent events packed tightly into it, waiting on their unfolding
- c) - but if I dwell on the beginning of my life thread, especially with the word seed in mind, a sort of forking, or separation, or branching, seems to take place within the density of that eventfulness. The line, or thread, breaks, or jumps, into a different line, to do with inheritance, and that goes back, way back, down the branching of an ancestral tree. But it doesn't only break or jump backwards. It also jumps sideways. The eventfulness of inheritance isn't only arranged like a tree. It is also like a pool, the word the geneticists use. The eventfulness of genetics is imagined as a source, a spring, a well, randomly throwing up.

d) - what is happening to my 'thread' now? It is becoming part of something more like a web. But not only a web. To take in all the event-fullness of my beginning, I have to think of a field, a matrix, of something like a fluid conductor, a fluid conductor with a consistency which is both conditioning and randomly originaive. (Cp. Whorf: *Language, Thought, and Reality*, chapter on "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language", pp.143-7

2. Now let's apply idea of event-fullness as a field, a matrix, a fluid conductor, to later times in my life.

- take the word impingement, which we use in talking of young children: how events impinge on the child

- story of when my first child was born.....

- to do justice to that, we have to think of events as impinging on the parents, on the grown ups looking after the child, on the whole environment, which may or may not be good enough

- some of these impinging events can be thought of as discrete, separate, particular

- but others can only be thought of as a mixing, as an eventing. What impinges is a constellation, influences which are distributed unevenly through a sort of fluid matrix in which social, historical, biological, events are randomly jostling each other

- so instead of thread, or even of web, we have to think more of scatter

- or, to use a cybernetic term, of noise

- how does the noise of random jostling compare with what happens when we, or fate, 'get the mixture right', and events 'set' nicely, thank you very much - ?

- that is the sort of question which needs the word 'consistency' for its answering

- my patient: the particular, the general

- "how does the consistency of my life tend to set?"

3. Other kinds of eventing come to mind, which help me understand better my patient's anxiety about being ready in time

- some are like a violent blow, a bolt from the blue, accidents that suddenly alter everything

- if we think of eventing as a thread, accidents break the thread. The connexity of sequence is broken

- but if we think of eventing as a fluid matrix, accidents shake the mixture violently, changing the consistency

- accidents can break a thread, or they can oscillate a mixture. It can make a lot of difference which way we think of them

- or take something which can appear as a kind of opposite to accident, yet can also seem strangely akin to accident: choice

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- we can experience choice as making a connection, as being in control of the process by which the next step follows on from where we are now

- and we can experience choice as a break. "You'll have to choose, I'm afraid. It is one or the other". Breaking a connection. This is like the risk of a jump.

- so think about choice and accident, how they compare: another case where it helps to be thinking of the consistency of time.

4. Now take the word attraction (which means being drawn, being pulled). The eventfulness of life depends a lot on attraction.

- if we are thinking of life as a thread, the ease of its direction depends on whether or not what comes next is attractive. The fullness or emptiness of the moment depends on whether 'getting on' attracts, on whether we can allow what isn't yet to draw us along

- as we grow older, it matters more and more whether we can imagine death as in any sense attractive, as an end which draws us to our close

- if we can, then perhaps as the end looms up even more insistent in its drawing power, the same sort of eventfulness which can inform the beginning of my life comes also to gather, or condense, round the ending

- then if we think of eventfulness as a matrix, attraction is across a field

- I push through a jostling crowd to a face which attracts me across the room

- an event, an idea, a person, acts as a catalyst. We talk about the chemistry between persons. An event has an effect which is magnetic, which alters the whole pattern of eventing

- musical metaphors abound as we describe the interior architecture which seems to decide how we fit into the system

- the arrangement of the field of events depends on their drawing power

5. **Eventing:** to illustrate preceding argument, try playing between these three columns

as field, matrix -----	as story line -----	human attitude to -----
dense	jumping	care
thin	forking	preoccupation
folding	break, broken	prudence
welling	straight	anxiety
vibrating	knotted	depression
conducting	devious	elation
insistent	repetitive	foresight
crowded	gripping	patience
striking	boring	hope
impinging	surprising	anticipation
jostling	risky	endurance
retentive	convincing	retrieval
sticky	satisfying	happy
loose	compelling	lucky
attractive	monotonous	busy
repulsive	fateful	boredom
scattered		interest
		surprise
		courage
		counting

"In a narrative, the measuring of time is not yet released from time reckoning because this reckoning is still visibly rooted in preoccupation" (Ricoeur, page 171)

Fourth Seminar - June 11

This was given over to discussion of material brought by members of the seminar.

1. A dream of a grandfather clock led us to think about clocks and the technology of time measurement, and how this in its turn may alter our assumptions about what we are supposed to be measuring.

2. A dream about the "implacable flow" of time led to discussion of whether an interest in the consistency of time could affect our experience of that implacability

3. A dream of a test tube baby, with references to "all those researches into cell membranes" raised questions about how Ricoeur's approach to time compares to evolutionary thinking. The issues touched on were felt to be "huge". Reference was made to the work of Adolf Portmann, Suzanne Langer, François Jacob.

4. A picture by Goya led us to talk about sex and time. How do we relate 'father' in the Cronos story with 'father' in the Oedipus story? In speaking of fathers and daughters, reference was made to my recent talk on *The Winter's Tale*: "Sex and the Wound of Time".

Fifth Seminar - June 18

1. The last two seminars were under the general heading of "Act of the Plot". We were trying to get inside that idea.

We began with some examples of 'plot' at work, then considered the words episode and configuration.

- what sort of day have you had? what sort of week have you had?
- it must be over a year since we last met.... what have you been up to?
- what sort of life have I had?

- there is a gathering, and a stringing together
- think of: I don't know where to begin, or, I don't know what to leave out

- note eye/ear difference: the mind's eye sees a field of events, but to tell them, they have to be arranged one after the other

- we can think of flow and sediment. Time flows on carrying everything with it. But bits get left behind. Some things stick in the mind. "I shan't forget that in a hurry".

- it's all so familiar that we may not notice it. But this is plot at work. This is what Ricoeur is picking out for questioning in the phrase "a story is made out of events to the extent that plot makes events into a story".

2. Some reflections on the word episode.

- epi-isode, an insertion between choric odes, an interval
- compare: incident, incidentally, a happening that interrupts, 'by the way'

- episode gets us away from the idea of steady flow, river. Instead, it conjures up idea of something more discrete, a number of intervals, time as made up of intervals

- discrete = separate, to add to the list of words I gave you, to try and get sense of human attitudes to time as entering into the constitution of time

- and compare discret: in classical Latin two strands of meaning to the word discernere, one from the past tense of the verb: that which has been separated, distinguished, leading to our discrete; and one from the present tense, the act of separating, the process of discernment, leading to our discret

- compare this double movement of the word with what I've said about 'eventing'

- note also OED on discret: judicious, prudent, circumspect; often especially that can be silent when speech would be inconvenient

- compare circumspect with Heidegger's Besorgt, preoccupation

- pre-occupy: a central theme in Heidegger's thought

- and compare also my traffic intersection image in my paper *Mood, Plot, and Parabolic Imagination*.

3. Some thoughts on the word configuration

- "Plot construes significant wholes out of scattered events"
- relate to therapy: unpacking, circumambulating, circumscribing

- scatter: randomness, dice, I Ching, throwing away, sowing seed
- then try and enlarge quite substantially: Matthew 12 v30 - "He who is not with me is against me, and he who does not gather with me scatters"
- gathering, harvest, introversion
- scattering, spring sowing, extraversion

- can one move from here into more mystical experience?
- configuration, both spatial and temporal: when we get both, we're close to the heart of the matter

- so try and relate
configuration, rhythm that selects, pulse between interiority and exteriority,
with breathing, song, poem

4. Link what's been said to therapeutic experience

- episode and configuration and Jung's complex theory
- my experience with the Word Association Test: scatter
- Heaton's article [see notes to sixth seminar]
- p.67 dangers of 'psychologism' overcome by attention to time
- pp.78-9, con-figural free floating: the interval as what presents, the "momentary break with the continuity of time as a parameter"

- oscillation as what goes on between the generations
- Jung CW 9 para 316, on mother and daughter
- Victoria Hamilton's *Narcissus and Oedipus*: cp my question last time as to how my thread's beginning is knotted into pre-existing matrices. Then
- p.95 a-symmetry of mother and baby
- p.97-8 interactional synchrony ("it takes two to make a beat")
- p.109 interdependence of rhythms depends on attention to novelty

5. Story shaped world

- Brian Wicker's book with that title
- event as how we participate in both the shape and the shaping
- episode and configuration as deepening and confirming this sense of eventing as both the context in which we find ourselves, and also the consistency with which we fill out that context
- this means that 'telling' comes from outside and inside. Or rather, 'to tell' is to draw on a source which is prior to our distinction between subject and object
- applied to psychology, this means that we have to think of psyche as active in time, and yet also as time-making. At times, this can seem simple and obvious; yet at other times, it seems to break psychology open into?

6. Sense of an Ending (with acknowledgment to Frank Kermode's book by that title)

- outline case of S's, as example of sort of situation in which I am being influenced by need for a sense of an ending
- difference between telling and retelling helps get inside the difference between living (the first telling?) and telling my story
- is the re-telling allowed to be different?
- is the whole point of re-telling that it should be different? so that we take control of the story?
- cp. child's insistence that the familiar story must always be told exactly the same, with history that has to be constantly re-written, because re-telling includes a 'new' element, which keeps history alive rather than dead
- but how does this cp. with official histories, which cannot be changed, for which revisionism is a crime?
- my dream in *The Timing of Analysis* paper as example
- apprehending the well known end as implied in the beginning. Here contrast between telling and re-telling takes us further inside difference between living and telling our story
- in living our story, 'now' is the tail end of what has gone before
- in telling our story, 'now' is when the telling can begin
- same point, through origins, originality
- going back to the beginning can be a boring retracing of our steps, OR it can be the return of, not to, originality
- relate to Hamilton p.109: importance of attention to novelty
- recollection inverts the so called natural order of time. This allows me to refer to Dunne's book (*A Search for God in Time and Memory*) through Ricoeur "In this way, a plot establishes human action not only within time...but within memory"
- refer again to my memory dream
- raise question of memory: do we think of memory as going back in time (horizontal), or as something more like 'sounding the foundation' (vertical), a sounding which is a resonating, a testing for what's 'down there'?
- German wiederholen, retrieval

[A seminar member contributed much of interest on the subject of "Chladni patterns". Here is a note on these.

"The phenomenon of harmonic resonance, or the representation of spatial structure expressed as patterns of standing waves in a resonating system. This tantalising similarity cannot be coincidental, considering that no other physical mechanism or phenomenon has ever been identified that exhibits these same enigmatic properties. The most remarkable property of harmonic resonance is the sheer number of different unique patterns that can be obtained in even the simplest resonating system. A pioneering study of more complex standing wave patterns was presented by Chladni (1787) who demonstrated the resonant patterns produced by a vibrating steel plate. The technique introduced by Chladni was to sprinkle sand on top of the plate, and then to set the plate into vibration by bowing with a violin bow. The vibration of the plate causes the sand to dance about randomly except at the nodes of vibration where the sand accumulates, thereby revealing the spatial pattern of nodes. This technique was refined by Waller (1961) using a piece of dry ice pressed against the plate, where the escaping gas due to the sublimation of the ice sets the plate into resonance, resulting in a high pitched squeal as the plate vibrates.]

Sixth Seminar - June 25

[These notes are more extended than for the other seminars, and were I think copied and circulated to all those taking part.]

"The Act of the Plot"

1. How the plottedness of life, the story-ness of life, puts time making into our hands, as well as taking place in time: the question from my notes which Sheila picked out.

Thinking about it, I start with a slight alteration: how the plottedness of life, the story-ness of life, puts time-making into us, as well as throwing us into time.

That's what I hope to show.

2. Let's begin with what I said last time about Jung's Word Association Test in relation to Jane's contribution about Chladni patterns. The Word Association Test led Jung to his idea of complex. What I've been saying about 'event' and 'eventing' in these seminars has much in common with the complex.

Here is Jolande Jacobi's description of the complex.

"Although psychic energy operates continuously, it is 'quantum like' in nature. The quanta in our comparison are the complexes, innumerable little points in an invisible network. In them, as distinguished from the 'empty' spaces, the energy charge of the unconscious collective psyche is concentrated, acting, in a manner of speaking, as the centre of a magnetic field. If the charge of one (or more) of these 'nodal points' becomes so powerful that it 'magnetically'.....attracts everything to itself....and so confronts the ego with an alien entity, a 'splinter psyche' that has become 'autonomous' - then we have a complex".

Jane's description of Chladni patterns reminds me of Jacobi's description of complexes. Chladni patterns are caused by vibration, by rhythm. I am suggesting that complexes are caused by vibration, by rhythm. My difficulty is in imagining the 'stuff' in which the vibration which causes complexes takes place. How does that 'stuff' get temporalised by rhythm? That's what I've been trying to explore in the play between the two meanings of consistency.

Here is another look at the same question, this time from a Freudian position. In the Freudian system, parapraxes (Freudian 'slips') occupy a place similar to the complex in the Jungian. John Heaton has contributed an interesting paper on "Time, Truth, and Parapraxis" to a collection *Time and Metaphysics* (1982: Parousia Press, University of Warwick) in which various people use Heidegger's work on Time, as I have been trying to in these seminars, to take further their particular interests.

Heaton is arguing against what he calls "psychologism". By this he means something like "psychological theory that has become a habit". He believes (I think rightly) that psychologism is bad for psychotherapy. In his paper he aims "to show how attention to time is one way of overcoming psychologism in psychotherapy and this enables us to enter the open realm where truth may show itself".

This is how he describes working with a parapraxis.

"So, what do we do when we are lost for a word or forget a familiar name? [cp. the Word Association Test]. We stop speaking and stop any form of representative thinking and submit to language. We become silent, we ponder a while and allow a sort of disarticulated language to float around and do not bother too much with what we are speaking or thinking about. We let language play and so the forgotten word may arise and with it something is disclosed. We allow language to give what we have failed to remember.....In the cure of a parapraxis we renounce trying to find the word, we renounce our relation to language. We cease aiming at some particular thing and demanding an answer and so momentarily break with the continuity of time as a parameter.....By forgetting a word we can retrieve its presencing".

"Momentary breaks with the continuity of time in which presencing is retrieved": I think that is what happens in the Word Association test. More general experience of "the retrieval of presencing in momentary breaks in the continuity of time" led Jung to his concept of synchronicity. What I've been trying to do in these seminars is to show that this sort of experience is not exceptional. It is what we get into as soon as we start recognising events as making up time, and not simply taking place in time. It is how 'incidents' which arrest our attention are also 'incidental', by the way. It is how 'eventing' plots itself into story.

3. Now I want to look at two very different descriptions of time as between the generations. The first is from Jung's essay on the Kore (para 316 of CW 9 part 1).

Demeter and Kore, mother and daughter, extend the feminine consciousness both upwards and downwards. They add an 'older and younger', 'stronger and weaker' dimension to it and widen out the narrowly limited conscious mind bound in space and time, giving it intimations of a greater and more comprehensive personality which has a share in the eternal course of things. We can hardly suppose that myth and mystery were invented for any conscious purpose; it seems much more likely that they were the involuntary revelation of a psychic, but unconscious pre-condition. The psyche pre-existent to consciousness (e.g., in the child) participates in the maternal psyche on the one hand, while on the other it reaches across to the daughter psyche. We could therefore say that every mother contains her daughter in herself and every daughter her mother, and that every woman extends backwards into her mother and forwards into her daughter. This participation and intermingling give rise to that peculiar uncertainty as regards *time*: a woman lives earlier as a mother, later as a daughter. The conscious experience of these ties produces the feeling that her life is spread out over generations - the first step towards the immediate experience of being outside time, which brings with it a feeling of *immortality*. The individual's life is elevated into a type, indeed it becomes the archetype of woman's fate in general. This leads to a restoration or *apocatastasis* of the lives of her ancestors, who now, through the bridge of the momentary individual, pass down into the generations of the future. An experience of this kind gives the individual a place and a meaning in the life of the generations, so that all unnecessary obstacles are cleared out of the way of the life-stream that is to flow through her. At the same time the individual is rescued from her isolation and restored to wholeness. All ritual preoccupation with archetypes ultimately has this aim and this result.

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A passage like that seems to be typical of the way Jung can give us a sense of 'deep temporality' which is comforting, enabling, hopeful. Writing of that kind abounds in his work on archetypes, and many of us can witness to its profoundly therapeutic effect. But I also feel that it calls for - more, it actively *invites* - more extended analysis of the kind Heidegger and others have developed as to how the surface of events and deep temporality are related. If we are to do justice to what is at stake between the generations I think there is a lot of work to be done here.

For instance, when Jung writes: "The conscious experience of these ties produced the feeling that her life is spread out over generations - the first step towards the immediate experience and conviction of being outside time, which brings with it a feeling of immortality": can we say more about this? Can we be more exact?

In the original German Jung is certainly saying something more than gets through into the English translation. He speaks of "der unmittelbaren Erfahrung und Gewissheit der Enthbung der Zeit": the immediate experience and certainty of relief from, or exemption from, time. The experience he is talking about is not simply of being outside time. The 'being outside time-ness' has a particular quality to it, a quality of relief, of exemption, of suspension. What *does* the exempting, the suspending?

I think it is important that when we have experiences like this of being outside time we try and describe their active quality as exactly as we can. If we do so, I believe we will find that our experience of more ordinary events will be enriched. The right word to describe just what it is like to be exceptionally *outside* time will help us to realise better what it is like to be usually *in* time. And that's one way of becoming more familiar with the consistency of time.

[On the question of translation, always of importance in reading Jung, compare also the English phrase in the above quotation "in the eternal course of things" with the German "an ewigen Geschehen". Once again that word Geschehen which was referred to in the second seminar, and see later in these notes.]

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My second description of time as between the generations is taken from Victoria Hamilton's book *Narcissus and Oedipus: the children of psychoanalysis*. It is from the chapter on 'interactional synchrony and mutuality', in which she reviews the work of Winnicott, Bower, and Brazelton on infant development. Here are three passages in which she refers to the question of timing.

[Read out in full. Here in brief:

p 95, on Winnicott, is about *mutuality*, and emphasises that whatever the previous experience of the mother, the baby "is being a baby for the first time".

pp 97-98, on Bower. The baby is seen "as an active initiator, who brings an expectation of dialogue and play to his new situation". The concept of *interactional synchrony* is seen as "more refined than the less specific concept of mutuality". (Note the word expectation.)

p 109, on Brazelton is about *rhythm*. "The attachment model may be too simple, since the rules governing interaction are extremely complex. The interdependency of rhythms may be at the root of mother-infant attachment..."]

In my notes at the time I summarised as follows:

Winnicott: is being a baby for the first time an experience we can take an initiative about?

Bower: how new is a new baby?

Brazelton: learning to learn through complexity and novelty.

Each of these very experienced workers is aware of the importance of timing as between mother and infant. But they are not allowing anything like a metaphysical questioning of time to obtrude on their observations. They aren't letting Heaton's "momentary breaks with the continuity of time in which presencing is retrieved" complicate matters. Why don't we try? If we do, I think we get closer to being able to imagine how being a baby is simultaneously so secure and also so unbelievably exposed.

It is the question we began with: in being thrown into time, do we bring time-making with us? Argument about the quality of a baby's initiative may be masking a different kind of argument as to how being and time are related. This is where there are difficulties between archetypal and developmental psychology which we must not gloss over.

If we assume that time is there irrespective of any making of ours, what we see in the interaction and rhythm between mother and baby will confirm this. But if we believe that the plottedness of life puts time-making into our hands, then we'll be looking for something different. We'll be looking for reminders of what time is like before we learn to take it for granted. We'll be looking for first times which are old, so old, so very old, just because they are always first. We will allow that in "learning through novelty and complexity" there have to be gaps, a lot of them, enough to let a whole matrix of originality, of firstness, come through.

4. This is where Ricoeur, and the tradition he represent, can help us. So let us now look more closely at Ricoeur's analysis of what the present is like, the day which is not just ephemeral but always the day in which and for which we pray for our daily bread, the now which is not an abstraction from mathematics but always a "now that", a "time for".

What is it like, this present which is so familiar that it can be rubbed out, flattened, emptied, allowed to fall in on itself, without our noticing?

Ricoeur describes it as a state of both abandonment and responsibility. "The time of the 'now that...', wherein a person is both abandoned and responsible at the same time" (foot of page 172 in our text).

We are abandoned. We are thrown into time.

We are responsible. Time is in our keeping.

What's it like when they come together? [and remember the sexual sense of 'come'.]

Here is a familiar example - Psalm 90.

our refuge from one generation to another
"turn back" thou sayest "you sons of men"
we spend our years as a tale that is told
teach us to number our days

How do the numbering, the spending, the telling, the turning back, generation, go (or come) together? That's what Ricoeur is trying to describe in this paper which we do not find easy to understand! He is trying to show how an analysis of narrative, of what we do when we tell stories, can help us with perennial problems of fate and free will.

Look again at what he says about Geschehen: happening, to happen.

He is talking about how the time available to us between birth and death relates to history, the times before I was born and after I shall die, or the times before I am born and after I am dead (it makes a difference which way we say it). He is talking to those of us who have occasion to ask "Does it all, my life, history, make any sense at all?". Into this questioning he introduces the idea of Geschehen as "the mediating structure between temporality (as the unity of coming-forth, having-been and making-present) and within-time-ness" (p.177). How does this mediating structure move us between our abandonment to, and our responsibility for, time?

It helps if we open up the word 'responsible'. To be able to respond. To answer. To answer what? A call. That means something I hear. So: listen. For what? Just listen.

Remember what we said in our first evening about readiness. There is a making ready. There is a being made ready. And then we say: Now I am ready. Remember what we said about the throwing across, and the turn to catch. Movement forward is accompanied by a turn to receive. Preparation and reparation go together.

These are the structures which mediate between abandonment and responsibility. Ricoeur analyses them further through the German word 'wiederholen', variously translated as to repeat, to recollect, to retrieve - more literally, to fetch again.

Sheila has drawn our attention to the word 'petition' within the word repetition.

I'd like to read out what she says, because it helps bring alive what Ricoeur is saying about retrievability. (I include also what she says about 'moment', as this describes Ricoeur's 'now that' well. Compare also what I have said about eventing and complex.)

How long is a moment? This question, asked by a child in one of Elizabeth Bowen's novels, has stayed with me for years, but I have never before explored the derivation of the word. Now I find that MOMENT belongs with MOVE, and can be traced back to a Latin word meaning 'to set oneself going'; it is connected with a Greek word meaning 'to become displaced, to pass beyond', and a Sanskrit word meaning 'impelled by desire'. A moment, then, seems to be a unit of time charged with emotion (exposed to image), whose effect might well be momentous.

Another jump into derivation. The word REPETITION (used by Leach in describing one way of experiencing time) belongs with PETITION: 'to try to obtain, to seek, to beg'. REPETITION in its Latin form means 'to attack again, the seek again'. I feel these connections support the idea that came across during the first seminar: that from the point of view of the complex, time is a pattern of events offering recurrent opportunities, through affinity, for that complex to rehearse or reenact its dilemma. I think of Culver Barker's excellent book *Healing in Depth*, and his use of the term 'dawn energy' in describing the release into present time of hitherto trapped parts of the personality. He speaks of areas of critical hurt, containing 'not only traumatic experiences that require attention but also live energy that got blocked. This is energy of a particular kind, dawn energy, close to the budding of a new phase of growth which, like nascent hydrogen, holds special power. Here suspended moments of time, instead of dying, by one of the wonders of nature and life survive with all their potential energy and vitality, miraculously retaining, maybe for decades, their original charge of specific libido".

That idea of dawn energy seems to me to be very close to the sense of the 'now that' which Ricoeur wants to remind us of. But I would hope that that dawn energy is retrievable in a more general sense than in therapy.

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Here are three of Ricoeur's dark sayings about *wiederholen*. (And, as you listen, think of a well, a vertical well, with the buckets being dropped down and then hauled up, and their contents then distributed on the horizontal level. We are so familiar with the turn, the kink, the slip, between the vertical and the horizontal that we take it for granted, we do not feel it as our responsibility. But we have at least to be asking ourselves: could it be 'up to us?')

"The fundamental structure thanks to which historicity is brought back to its origin in the originary structure of temporality".

"Thanks to repetition as fate, retrospection is reconnected to anticipation, and anticipation is rooted in retrospection".

"Fate is the character of thrownness of all authentic projects. The German expressions here are very strong, since project and thrownness belong to the same semantic field: *Entwurf*, *Geworfenheit*. So Heidegger can even speak of a 'thrown project' (*ein geworfener Entwurf*)".

I think we can relate these to Culver Barker's idea of dawn energy through the word promise.

Some of you have heard me talk at length on the nature of promise. I want now to keep it short. Think of the vertical, and the horizontal. How does the vertical 'hold' while leaving us free to move along the horizontal? Promise can be thought of as a holding up which the vertical exercises from above the line of the horizontal. Or it can be thought of as a resource, a welling up and a referring down, on the vertical from and to below the line. On the vertical we call down, we draw up. Scattering and gathering, gathering and scattering, go together. The bucket is let down and is raised up, again and again yet always now, so that we may go on.

Time as promising. Promising isn't something we do in time. It is what time is like. "The fundamental structure thanks to which historicity is brought back to its origin in the originary structure of temporality". Promise. How does time guarantee its own originality? We can't name it in abstraction. But we know it nevertheless. Every time we say "I give you my promise", or, from the other side, "But you promised.....", we bear witness to a holding from above which is also a retrieval from below. Dawn energy. Promise.

5. I want to conclude by relating this argument from Ricoeur to the statements from Jung and Victoria Hamilton's book. Let's start with the mother and baby as described in the psychoanalytic tradition.

Winnicott sums up the problem of originality in the first months of life in a remark to which I find that I return again and again: "We all know that we will never challenge the baby to elicit an answer to the question: did you create that or did you find it?" (from the chapter "The Use of an Object and Relating through Identifications" in *Playing and Reality*, p.89).

I want to pivot that question on what I've been saying about Ricoeur's argument, and see what happens if we restate Winnicott's remark as: "We will never challenge the baby to answer for the creation of time".

When the baby is old enough to talk, there will be a time, a few weeks only perhaps, when it will be asking questions about itself and its objects which reverberate the question which Winnicott says will never be asked. Where was I before I was born? Where did the first man come from? Where did the first tree come from, the first dog, the first.....?

The problem of beginnings. Wondering about creation. Ricoeur is arguing that if we took story telling as seriously as we should, then wondering of this kind would be part of the air we breathe, our environment would be full of it. 'Answering for the creation of time' would be going on all round us, in streets and schools and hospitals and parliaments, not only in half empty churches.

In such an environment, there would be an age when children would be initiated into adult questioning about what guarantees the originality of time. In such an environment, it would be obvious that the reason we do not challenge the baby to elicit an answer to Winnicott's question is that we haven't got to it yet. It belongs later, to when the child is being initiated into adult questioning as to how in being abandoned to time we can nevertheless retrieve our responsibility for time. What we call object relations theory is as much about the sociology of religion as it is about the development of individuals.

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Think now of Jung's description of the containment of mother by daughter, and of daughter by mother, a containment which is also an alternation that carries with it a feeling of immortality, a conviction of being outside time. Can we say anything more about the quality of that *Enthebung*, that suspension or exemption from the passing of time?

More than any other single one of his works, Jung's essay on the Kore has got me, and kept me, wondering about what goes on between the generations. Its effect on me is closely related to the companion essay of Kerenyi, in the book in which it first appeared (*Introduction to a Science of Mythology: the myth of the Divine Child and the Mysteries of Eleusis*, 1951).

The sense of a containment which is also an alternation has become part of the background of my experience of family over three decades of growing older. Recently, it has been brought more to the foreground by reading my mother's diaries and letters which she left me at her death. Reading, in my middle fifties, what my mother was writing about her life as a young woman thirty years younger than me, but so infinitely older because I am not yet born at the time of which I am reading, has left me with a strong sense of an overlapping, folding back, of times which are simultaneously before and after each other. And this is not in any way extraordinary. It is what growing up and growing old together with other people is like, an exchanging between different configurations of story, an exchanging between looking forward and looking back, which is like a rhythm folded on itself rather than the flow of a river.

Anticipation is rooted in retrospection, and retrospection is reconnected to anticipation.

Between the generations there are moments of exemption, of suspension, from the passing of time. I have spoken of a rhythm folded on itself. We also speak of other goings on between the generations. Sons kill their fathers. Parents eat their children. Envy and gratitude, omnipotence and impotence, compete and in competing create blocks through which nothing can move. How can we understand such variety? I don't think we can unless we are willing to believe that, in some way which we cannot put into words, what is at stake between the generations is the creation of time itself.

When talking about complexes and parapraes I used the expression "momentary breaks with the continuity of time in which presencing is retrieved". The flow of time is full of breaks, and in the interval that breaks (interrupts) continuity the present is made ready for retrieval. How does this relate to that feeling of immortality which Jung describes so richly in the essay on the Kore?

It's here that I find Ricoeur's use of Heidegger helpful. Those heavy sentences I quoted can sound deliberately obscure. "Fate is the character of thrownness of all authentic projects". The German expressions here are very strong, since project and thrownness belong to the same semantic field: Entwurf, Geworfenheit (and as we have seen Heidegger can speak of 'ein geworfener Entwurf'). But it fits the Oedipus story as told by Sophocles.

I remember when we acted it, the moment when Oedipus and Jocasta come to meet each other in the marriage necessary to keep the public clocks of the city going, and know each other for who they are. There is a moment in which time seems to stand still (as we say) before it moves on again, as the recognition is dropped, left by the way, and history takes precedence over nature. That is what a thrown project is like. That is what it is like to have time-making put into our hands as well as being thrown into time. The plottedness of life, fate, the character of thrownness of all authentic projects, abandonment and responsibility.

But story telling reminds us there is another way of playing that moment: the way of comedy. We can play the generation game tragically, or we can play it as comedy. Shakespeare's *Winter's Tale*, which some of us worked on last year, does both. Which is where the Demeter-Persephone myth, and others like it, can move in redemption across stories like that of Oedipus and of Isaac and his father Abraham. If Jesus did have a sense of humour, perhaps that is what he had in mind when he spoke of the gathering and the scattering (a reference to the previous seminar).

So what have I said about "the act of the plot"? I would summarise thus.

To relate what Ricoeur means by the act of the plot to psychoanalytic thinking, Jungian and Freudian, I suggest two groups of ideas, one constellated round the word promise, the other round the word rhythm.

Promise

Promise as binding continuity to retrieval.

Can we understand the conjunctions of death, birth and sexuality to which psychoanalysis gives such careful attention, as 'promising' in that sense? That's one way into the act of the plot.

(See on this also André Green's *The Tragic Effect*, Cambridge, 1979, which has a foreword by Frank Kermode.)

Rhythm

Rhythm as allowing, and requiring, both containment and alternation.

Think about the relation between containment and alternation in your experience. Is psychoanalytic talk about insides and outsides, subjects and objects, about time as well as about space?

There are personal rhythms, and the rhythm between nature and history. How are they related?

There is rhythm which recognises, as the Book of Genesis does, that time is the fault of gender. There is also a rhythm which recognises, (as I don't think the Bible does) that this fault is subject for comedy as well as tragedy.